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Abstract
The eﬃciency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma
game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random in-
teractions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian
equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolu-
tionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the
equilibrium set to two points. In one EPBE, only the non-vengeful type survives and there are
no mutual gains. In the other EPBE, both types survive and reap mutual gains.
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21 Introduction
Craving vengeance is a powerful human motive: when some culprit harms you or your loved ones,
you may choose to incur a substantial personal cost to harm him in return. There can be major
economic and social consequences, positive and negative. Economic theory has not yet fully come
to grips with such motives. In this paper we model vengeance as an emotional state dependent
utility component and investigate its eﬃciency impact and its viability.
A taste for vengeance, the desire to “get even,” is so much a part of daily life (and the evening
news) that it is easy to miss the evolutionary puzzle. We shall argue that indulging one’s taste
for vengeance in general reduces one’s material payoﬀ or ﬁtness. Absent countervailing forces, the
meek (less vengeful people) should have inherited the earth long ago, because they had higher
ﬁtness. Why then does vengeance persist?
To investigate the question, we introduce a new equilibrium concept,1 evolutionary perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE), that seems germane in a wide variety of applications. EPBE extends
the equal proﬁt condition of competitive markets into games of incomplete information with possible
entry, exit and/or switching among multiple player types. Our paper uses EPBE to show how
vengeance can persist despite its apparent ﬁtness handicap.
Vengeance is closely tied to several vexing issues, methodological and substantive. Therefore
we begin in Section 2 with a preliminary discussion on the nature of social dilemmas, the meaning
of positive and negative reciprocity, why both are important to economists, and various model-
ing approaches. Our contribution to this literature is to demonstrate the viability of a taste for
vengeance even when people interact in unstructured large groups, and the degree of vengefulness
is continuously variable and imperfectly observed.
Section 3 presents the basic social dilemma as a simple extensive form game, and shows how
vengeful preferences can dramatically improve equilibrium eﬃciency. It spotlights the evolution-
ary problem when an individual’s vengefulness cannot be perfectly known in advance and when
behavioral errors are possible. Finally, it argues for a simpliﬁcation of the analysis: of all possible
distributions in continuous type space, it suﬃces to look only at those supported on just two points.
Section 4 derives seven continuous families of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE): two pooling
equilibria, one separating equilibrium, two mixed equilibria and two hybrids. The PBE are short-
run in that the nature and proportions of all player types are ﬁxed. Section 5 examines the long-run
in which the nature and proportions of types can evolve. We deﬁne EPBE and show that in our
game it reﬁnes the equilibrium set from seven families down to two points: a unique EPBE that
1As noted in concluding discussion and in the Appendix, Abreu and Sethi (2003) independently use essentially
the same concept in a particular bargaining model.
1supports social gains (characterized in Proposition 2, our central result), and a trivial, ineﬃcient
EPBE (also in Proposition 2). A concluding section discusses generalizations and emergent issues.
The Appendix collects the mathematical details.
2 Preliminaries
An action has a social dimension when it aﬀects non-actors as well as the actor. Figure 1 lays out
the possibilities in terms of the net material beneﬁt (x > 0) or cost (x < 0) to the actor, denoted
“Self,” and the net material beneﬁt (y > 0) or cost (y < 0) to counterparties, denoted “Other”.
Economists think most often about the mutual gains quadrant I, where actions simultaneously
beneﬁt Self and Other. Such symbiotic actions increase social eﬃciency.
Quadrant IV is the well-studied opportunistic region, where Self beneﬁts at Other’s expense;
the biological terms are parasitism and predation. The ﬂip side is the altruism quadrant II, where
Self bears a personal cost in order to beneﬁt Other. Quadrant III is especially interesting to us.
Cipolla (1976) refers to actions producing such outcomes as stupidity, but vengeance often will be
a better explanation.
Social dilemmas arise from the fact that evolution directly supports behavior that beneﬁts Self,
i.e., outcomes x > 0 in quadrants IV (or I) but not x < 0 in II (or III), while in contrast, eﬃciency
requires outcomes above the diagonal [x + y = 0].2 Social creatures (such as humans) thrive on
devices that support outcomes in the half-quadrant II+ and discourage outcomes in IV-. Such
devices somehow internalize Other’s costs and beneﬁts.
———–ﬁg 1 about here———–
2.1 Eﬃciency-enhancing devices
Biologists emphasize the role of genetic relatedness.3 If Other is related to Self to degree r > 0, then
a positive fraction of Other’s payoﬀs are internalized via “inclusive ﬁtness” (Hamilton, 1964) and
evolution favors outcomes above the line [x + ry = 0]. For example, the unusual genetics of insect
order hymenoptera produce r up to 3
4 between sisters; most social insects (including ants and bees)
belong to this order and the workers are indeed sisters. For humans and most other species, r is
2More precisely, Self’s iso-ﬁtness curves are the vertical lines x = C while iso-eﬃciency curves are diagonal lines
x + y = C. The status quo point (0, 0) ensures that C ≥ 0 is feasible.
3Bergstrom (2002) and Robson (2002) provide excellent summaries of recent biological insights into economic
behavior. Henrich (2004) and subsequent articles in the special issue of JEBO dissect the biological and cultural
basis of human cooperation. Henrich also notes the limited scope of standard inclusive ﬁtness and folk theorem
arguments, and emphasizes the role of structured interactions, or modern group selection.
2only 1
2 for full siblings and for parent and child, is 1
8 for ﬁrst cousins, and goes to zero exponentially
for more distant relations. On average r is small in human interactions, as in the steep dashed line
in Figure 1, since we typically have only a few children but work and live in groups with dozens of
individuals. Clearly other devices are needed to support human social behavior.
Economists emphasize devices based on repeated interaction, as in the “folk theorem” (e.g.,
Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Suppose that Other returns the beneﬁt (“positive reciprocity”)
with probability and delay together summarized in discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). Then that fraction of
other’s payoﬀs are internalized (Trivers, 1971) and evolution favors behavior producing outcomes
above the line [x + δy = 0]. This internalization can support a large portion of socially eﬃcient
behavior when δ is close to 1, i.e., when interactions between two individuals are symmetric,
predictable, frequent and ongoing.4 But humans specialize in exploiting once-oﬀ opportunities
with a variety of diﬀerent partners, in which case δ is small, as in the same steep dashed line.
Other devices are needed to explain cooperation in such situations.
Here we will emphasize devices based on other-regarding preferences. For example, suppose
Self gets a utility increment of ry from his or her action,5 in addition to the material beneﬁt x.
Hence Self partially internalizes the material externality, and undertakes behavior that is above the
line [x + ry = 0]. Friendly preferences, r ∈ [0, 1], thus can explain the same range of behavior as
genetic relatedness and repeated interaction. However, by itself the friendly preference device is
evolutionarily unstable: those with lower positive r will tend to make more personally advantageous
choices, gain higher material payoﬀ (or ﬁtness), and displace the more friendly types. Friendly
preferences therefore require the support of other devices.
Vengeful preferences rescue friendly preferences. Self’s material incentive to reduce r disappears
when others base their values of r on Self’s previous behavior and employ r < 0 if Self is insuﬃciently
friendly. Such visits to quadrant III will reduce the ﬁtness of less friendly behavior and thus boost
friendly behavior.6 But visits to quadrant III are also costly to the avenger, so less vengeful
preferences seem ﬁtter. What then supports vengeful preferences: who guards the guardians? This
question motivates the present paper.
4See Sethi and Somanathan (2003) for an extended discussion and survey of this device from the perspective of
evolutionary game theory. Our own approach may be seen as complementary to the analysis of repeated interactions,
covering diﬀerent circumstances.
5Rilling et al (2002), was among the ﬁrst studies to present physiological evidence for such increments, based on
fMRI brain scans of subjects playing prisoner’s dilemma.
6This idea is developed in the altruistic punishments literature (e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Boyd et. al, 2003).
As emphasized in Henrich (2004), the analysis relies on structured populations and group selection.
32.2 Modeling other regarding preferences
Two main modeling approaches can be distinguished in the recent literature. The distributional
preferences approach7 begins with a standard selﬁsh utility function and adds additional terms
capturing Self’s response to how own payoﬀ compares to Other’s payoﬀs. The psychological games
approach captures reciprocity by postulating that my preferences regarding your payoﬀ depend on
my beliefs about your intentions.8
We favor an alternative approach, inspired by the pioneering work of Hirshleifer (1987) and
Frank (1988). Model reciprocal preferences as state dependent: my attitude towards your payoﬀs
depends on my emotional state, e.g., friendly or vengeful, and your behavior systematically alters
my emotional state. Cox et al. (2007) show that a 3 or 4 parameter model incorporating this
approach accounts well for existing laboratory data.9 Fortunately, a very simple rule suﬃces for
present purposes: you become vengeful towards those who betray your trust, and otherwise have
standard selﬁsh preferences.
To be convincing, a model of other regarding preferences must account for the empirical data
and also should pass the following theoretical test: people with the hypothesized preferences receive
at least as much material payoﬀ (or evolutionary ﬁtness) as people with alternative preferences.
This test is referred to as indirect evolution (G¨ uth and Yaari, 1992; precursors include Becker, 1976,
and Rubin and Paul, 1979) because evolution operates on preference parameters that determine
behavior rather than directly on behavior.
The evolutionary test is prominent in a number of recent papers,10, several of which bear directly
on present concerns. Huck and Oechssler (1999) show that vengeance can survive in small groups,
where a vengeful person can impair others’ ﬁtness more than his own. Herold (2003) shows that
positive as well as negative reciprocity (vengeance) can survive in a ”haystack” model, in which
people interact in small groups that are occasionally remixed. Our concern, however, is with large
unstructured populations.
In his introduction to the literature, Samuelson (2001) oﬀers two challenges: can the hypothe-
7This approach is exempliﬁed in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality aversion model, the Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) mean preferring model, and the Charness and Rabin (2002) social maximin model.
8Building on the Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) model, Rabin (1993) constructs reciprocity equilibria
for two player normal form games, and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) adapt
the idea to extensive form games. Levine (1998) improves tractability by replacing beliefs about others’ intentions
by estimates of others’ type.
9A psychological theory of how emotional states change (e.g., van Winden, 2001) rounds out this approach; see
also Gintis (2002) and Sobel (2005).
10For example, Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (1998), Ely and Yilankaya (2001), Kockesen, Ok and Sethi (2000),
Samuelson and Swinkels (2001), and Possajennikov (2002).
4sized preferences emerge when there is a full range of alternatives, not just a handful, and can they
emerge when they are not perfectly observable? The ﬁrst challenge is especially acute here because
many previous models of negative reciprocity are susceptible to unraveling: slightly lesser degrees
of vengefulness have higher ﬁtness. Heifetz et al. (2007) is an important exception. They show
in great generality that, given observability, some distortion of selﬁsh preferences (what they call
dispositions) generically survives evolutionary pressure. They also consider imperfect observability,
but only in a special case that assumes that Bayesian Nash Equilibria are locally unique and that
perceptual errors are uniformly bounded, neither of which holds in the model we present below.
Bohnet et. al (2001, Appendix A) sketch a model with imperfect type observability, but again it
covers only a special case that lies outside our present concerns. Like us, G¨ uth et. al (2000) exam-
ine observability in a trust game, but it takes a quite diﬀerent form. They analyze the fraction of
players with ”moral” dispositions and the fraction adopting a perfect but costly observation tech-
nology. As Samuelson notes, evolution favors those who can appear more committed (i.e., vengeful
in our context) than they really are, so perfect observability seems unrealistic.
To summarize, within existing literature on other regarding preferences, our paper is distin-
guished by its focus on: (a) vengeance, a contingent preference for costly punishment. The ma-
jority of papers focus on noncontingent preferences (or dispositions), or on positive reciprocity.
(b) Evolution in large unstructured populations, a more challenging and general environment. (c)
Imperfect observability, responding to Samuelson’s second challenge. Players never know for sure
how vengeful their partners might be. (d) A continuum of types. In response to Samuelson’s ﬁrst
challenge, we want to show that a greater or lesser degree of vengefulness will not lead to higher
material payoﬀs.
3 The Underlying Game
The ﬁrst step in analyzing social preferences is to model explicitly the underlying social dilemma.
We use a simple extensive form version of the prisoner’s dilemma, or the holdup problem, also known
as the Trust game (G¨ uth and Kliemt, 1994). As shown in Panel A of Figure 2, Player 1 (Self) can
opt out (N) and ensure payoﬀs normalized to zero for both players. Alternatively Self can trust (T)
player 2 (Other) to cooperate (C), giving both players payoﬀs normalized to 1 and (assuming equal
welfare weights) a social gain of 2. There is a social dilemma because Other’s payoﬀ is maximized
by defecting (D), increasing his payoﬀ to 2 but reducing Self’s payoﬀ to -1 and the social gain to
1. In the Appendix, we show how these speciﬁc payoﬀ values can be generalized. The basic game
has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome and unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium found by
5backward induction: Self chooses N because Other would choose D if given the opportunity, and
social gains are zero.
To this underlying game we add a punishment technology and a punishment motive as shown in
Panel B. Self now has the last move and can inﬂict harm (payoﬀ loss) h on Other at personal cost
ch. The marginal cost parameter c captures the technological opportunities for punishing others.
———–ﬁg 2 about here———–
Self’s punishment motive is given by state dependent preferences. If Other chooses D then Self
receives a utility bonus of v lnh (but no ﬁtness bonus) from Other’s harm h. In other states utility is
equal to own payoﬀ. The motivational parameter v is subject to evolutionary forces and is intended
to capture an individual’s temperament, e.g., his susceptibility to anger. The functional forms for
punishment technology and motivation are convenient (we will see shortly that v parameterizes the
incurred cost), but not necessary for the main results. The results require only that the chosen
harm and incurred cost are increasing in v and have adequate range.
Using the notation ID to indicate the event “Other chooses D,” we write Self’s utility function
as U = x + vID lnh, that is, own material payoﬀ x plus the relevant emotional state component.
When facing a ”culprit” (ID =1), Self chooses the reduction h in Other’s payoﬀ so as to maximize
U = −1−ch+v lnh. The unique solution of the ﬁrst order condition is h∗ = v/c and the incurred
cost is indeed ch∗ = v. For the moment assume that Other correctly anticipates this choice. Then
we obtain the reduced game in Panel C. For selﬁsh preferences (v = 0) it coincides with the original
version in Panel A with unique Nash equilibrium (N, D) yielding the ineﬃcient outcome (0, 0).
For v > c, however, the transformed game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (T, C)
yielding the eﬃcient outcome (1, 1). The threat of vengeance rationalizes Other’s cooperation and
Self’s trust.
3.1 Can vengeful preferences evolve?
Vengeance thus may have a pro-social role, but is it viable? To answer the question properly
(Samuelson, 2001), we must consider imperfect observability, which we refer to as noisy perceptions.
For the moment, assume Other perceives Self’s vengeance level as u = v+y when the true vengeance
level is v. The error y has scale (e.g., standard deviation) σ ≥ 0.
Behavioral noise is also crucial in ensuring the evolutionary viability of vengeance, because it
confounds the inference of type from behavior. Self may intend to choose N but may twist an ankle
and ﬁnd himself depending on Other’s cooperative behavior, and Other may intend to choose C
but oversleeps or gets tied up in traﬃc. Such considerations can be summarized in a tremble rate
e ≥ 0. Larger values of e tend to raise Self’s cost of vengefulness and reduce ﬁtness.
6A preliminary analysis of viability proceeds as follows. Fix noise levels e ≥ 0 and σ ≥ 0, and
ﬁx the marginal punishment cost c > 0. Assume that for a given distribution of v within the
population, the choices of Self and Other adjust rapidly towards (short run) Nash equilibrium. The
task is to compute Self’s expected ﬁtness or material payoﬀ w(v;σ,e) for each value of v at the
relevant short run equilibrium.
First consider the case σ = e = 0, where v is perfectly perceived and behavior is noiseless.
Recall that in this case the short run equilibrium (N, D) with payoﬀ w = 0 prevails for v ≤ c, and
(T, C) with w = 1 prevails for v ≥ c. Thus w(v;0,0) is the unit step function at v = c, shown as
the dotted line in Figure 3.
———–ﬁg 3 about here———–
With behavioral but no perceptual noise, e > 0 = σ, more vengeful types incur a greater cost
when punishment is called for. The bold solid line in Figure 3 shows that now Self’s ﬁtness function
slopes downward at approximate rate −e. Finally, with perceptual noise also present, σ > 0, the
sharp step at v = c is smoothed out. Figure 3 shows two local ﬁtness maxima for Self, one at
v = 0 and the other at v = vH > c, when σ and e are both small and positive. The underlying
calculations are collected in subsection 4 of the Appendix.
The ﬁtness function w deﬁnes a one-dimensional landscape in which evolution pushes the evolv-
ing trait v uphill along the ﬁtness gradient.11 Figure 3 therefore suggests that we will end up with
some fraction x of the Self population with vengeance near vH > c and the remaining (1−x) with
vengeance near v = 0. The fractions represent the arbitrary portions of the population initially
above and below the ﬁtness minimum (near c − σ).
4 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The implication of the preceding discussion in the previous section is that we don’t need to consider
all possible distributions over a continuum of vengeance types. The equilibrium distributions will
have support on just two points, one at v = 0 and the other at some speciﬁc vH > c, ﬁxed in
the short run but variable in the long run. With just two types, we streamline the short run
analysis (at a slight loss of generality) by focusing on the misperception probabilities rather than
the entire error distribution. Therefore we deﬁne perception as a binary variable s, with s = 1
11As its title suggests, the present paper does not specify evolutionary dynamics. However, dynamical intuition
will help motivate the formal deﬁnition of EPBE presented below. We therefore note that continuous movement up
the ﬁtness gradient has well established antecedents, e.g., Wright (1949), Eshel (1983) and Kauﬀman (1993). Such
landscape dynamics (Friedman, 2005) are quite distinct conceptually and formally from mutations in a discrete type
space and from replicator-type dynamics.
7denoting the perception that Self is vengeful, and s = 0 denoting the perception that Self is not
vengeful. It is convenient (but not essential) to assume equal misperception probabilities and write
a = Pr[s = 0|v = vH] = Pr[s = 1|v = 0].
———–ﬁg 4 about here———–
Figure 4 shows the game tree. Nature chooses Self’s true preference parameter as v = 0
(unvengeful) with probability 1 − x, or as v = vH > c (vengeful) with probability x. Nature also
independently chooses Other’s perception as correct (s = 0 for v = 0, or s = 1 for v = vH) with
probability 1 − a, or incorrect with probability a ∈ [0,1/2). Self knows her own preference but not
the realized perception, and Other knows the perception but not the true preference.
Self’s “pure” strategy set is denoted {NN, NT, TN and TT}, where XY means the unvengeful
type tries to play X and the vengeful type tries to play Y. To spell this out, the space of mixed
strategies is the unit square with corners at the pure strategies when there are no trembles. With
trembles e ≥ 0, Self’s strategy space shrinks to the smaller square [e,1 − e] × [e,1 − e], and a
corner strategy such as NT means that that N and T are actually played with probability 1−e by
respectively the unvengeful and vengeful type Self. Similarly, Other’s “pure” strategy set is {DD,
DC, CD and CC}, where now XY stands for the strategy ‘play X if s = 0 and play Y if s = 1.’
Here ”play” means to actually play with maximal probability 1−e. Thus Other’s strategy space is
also [e,1−e]×[e,1−e]. The payoﬀs shown in Figure 4 are the same as in the reduced Trust game
of Figure 2C.
The relevant equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, PBE (e.g., Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991, chapter 8), suitably phrased to deal with large populations and explicit trembles.
PBE requires all players to optimize given beliefs, and requires that beliefs are Bayesian poste-
rior probabilities obtained from perceptions, observed actions, and prior information on the type
proportions.
What sort of PBE might exist? The ﬁrst candidate is a separating equilibrium, call it SEP, in
which Other plays DC and Self plays NT. Other prominent candidates are GP, the “good pooling”
PBE in which Self plays TT and Other plays CC, and the “bad pooling ” equilibrium BP = (NN,
DD). In testing for any of these equilibria, the key conditions arise from Other’s decision problem
after a noisy perception. Other compares the expectation of the D payoﬀ 2−v/c to the C payoﬀ 1.
This comparison immediately leads to the rule: play D if E(v|s) ≤ c, or play C if E(v|s) ≥ c. To
illustrate, consider an s = 0 perception when Self plays NT. The perception is erroneous precisely
when a vH type actually chooses T (i.e., doesn’t tremble) and Other misperceives, which happens
with probability x(1−e)a. The perception is correct precisely when a v = 0 type trembles to T and
is correctly perceived, which happens with probability (1−x)e(1−a). A straightforward Bayesian
8calculation now shows that the critical posterior expectation E(v|s = 0) = c corresponds to prior
probability (or population fraction) xs = 1/(1 + ( a
1−a)(1−e
e )(vH−c
c )). Hence the rule states that
Other should play D when observing s = 0 if x ≤ xs. Using the log odds function L(y) = ln(
1−y
y ),
this necessary condition for SEP can be rewritten L(x) ≥ L(xs) = −L(a) + L(e) + L(c/vH).
———–table 1 about here———–
Using Table 1, the reader can perform very similar calculations for other cases (s = 1 percep-
tions and Self strategies TT and NN) to obtain bounds on Other’s best responses in terms of the
population fractions x or their log odds. Combining them with straightforward computations of
Self’s best responses leads to necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of the three pure
strategy PBEs.
Straightforward computations show that Other strategy CD is dominated and that Self strategy
TN is never a best response to Other’s undominated strategies, so only strategies on the Northwest
frontier of the strategy spaces need be considered in candidate PBEs. As shown in Figure 5, SEP
and BP exist over overlapping ranges in the prevalence x of vengeful types, and there is a gap
between these and the range where GP exists.
————–ﬁg 5 about here——
There are also mixed PBEs.12 The best response correspondences show that there is some mix
q∗ ∈ [0,1] of DC and CC that makes Self indiﬀerent between TT and NT. We have a candidate
mixed PBE if there is also some mix t∗(x) ∈ [0,1] of TT and NT that makes Other indiﬀerent
between DC and CC. It turns out that the proﬁle (t∗(x)TT + (1 − t∗(x))NT,q∗DC + (1 − q∗)CC)
is a PBE, call it the Good Mix (GM), precisely when x lies in the gap.
Are there any other mixed PBEs? The same logic points to one other possibility. Consider
(u∗(x)NT +(1−u∗(x))NN,r∗DD +(1−r∗)DC), where r∗ ∈ [0,1] makes Self indiﬀerent between
NN and NT, and u∗(x) ∈ [0,1] makes Other indiﬀerent between DC and DD. This Bad Mix (BM),
as we shall call it, turns out to be a PBE whenever x lies in the range overlap for the BP and the
SEP PBEs.
The best response correspondences permit no other PBEs over a nontrivial range of x. They do
produce other PBEs at two isolated points. When L(x) = L(c/vH) − L(a), both CC and DC are
best responses to TT, and TT is a best response to qDC+ (1 − q)CC as long as q ∈ [0,q∗]. Hence
at this point, there is a continuum of PBEs, call them Good Hybrids, that vary only in Other’s
mixing probability q. Finally, where L(x) = L(c/vH)+L(e)+L(a), we have the Bad Hybrids (BH)
(NT, rDD+ (1-r)DC) for r ∈ [r∗,1]. Proposition 1 characterizes all the PBEs.
Proposition 1. Given perceptions with error rate a and choices with tremble rate e, and
12We are indebted to Steve Morris for urging us to investigate these.
9given types v = 0 and v = vH > c constituting respectively Self population fractions (1 − x) and
x ∈ (0,1), assume that 0 < a,e < 1/2 and α = a+e−2ae ≤ 1/(2+vH). The complete set of PBE
consists of:
1. the GP family (TT, CC) for L(x) ≤ L(c/vH) − L(a);
2. the SEP family (NT, DC) for L(c/vH) + L(e) − L(a) ≤ L(x) ≤ L(c/vH) + L(e) + L(a);
3. the BP family (NN, DD) for L(x) ≥ L(c/vH) + L(a);
4. the GM family (t∗(x)TT+(1-t∗(x))NT, q∗DC+(1-q∗)CC) for L(c/vH) − L(a) ≤ L(x) ≤
L(c/vH) + L(e) − L(a);
5. the BM family (u∗(x)NT+(1-u∗(x))NN, r∗DD+(1-r∗)DC) for L(c/vH) + L(a) ≤ L(x) ≤
L(c/vH) + L(e) + L(a);
6. the GH family (TT, qDC+(1-q)CC), for q ∈ [0,q∗], at the point where L(x) = L(c/vH)−L(a);
and
7. the BH family (NT, rDD+(1-r)DC) for r ∈ [r∗,1], at the point where L(x) = L(c/vH) +
L(e) + L(a).
The proof, in the Appendix, includes formulas for q∗,r∗,t∗ and u∗.
A numerical example will help ﬁx ideas. Set the marginal punishment cost at c = 0.5 and the
vengeful type’s preferred punishment expenditure at vH = 2.0. Set the tremble rate at e = 0.05 and
the misperception rate at a = 0.10. As shown in Figure 5, for suﬃciently small proportions of the
vengeful type (L(x) ≥ 3.30 or x ≤ 0.036) we have a Bad Pooling equilibrium: both types of Self try
to opt out and Other tries to defect regardless of perception. For an overlapping range of vengeful
type proportions (L(x) ∈ [1.85,6.24] or x ∈ [0.002,0.136]) we have the Separating equilibrium. In
the overlap x ∈ [0.036,0.136], there is also the Bad Mix PBE. No pure strategy PBE exists (just
the Good Mix PBE, for which q∗ = 5/9 and t∗(x) ≈ .35 x
1−x − .06) for higher values of x until
we reach x = 0.75, after which point we have the Good Pooling equilibrium. The Good Hybrid
equilibrium exists at x=0.75 for q ∈ [0,5/9], and the Bad Hybrid equilibrium exists at x=0.002 for
r ∈ [70/81,1].
5 Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The numerical example spotlights an evolutionary problem. In the separating PBE, the vengeful
type has higher ﬁtness (0.418) than the unvengeful type (-0.036). Therefore, by the basic principle
10of evolution, the fraction x of vengeful types should increase. But the separating PBE disappears
when x gets above .136. The same is true for the GM equilibrium: the vengeful types have ﬁtness
0.665 while the unvengeful types have ﬁtness 0, so again x should increase past the point (here
0.75) where the equilibrium disappears. However, when x > .75, we have only the GP equilibrium.
Now the unvengeful type is ﬁtter (0.855) than the vengeful type (0.760), so x should decrease until
it falls below .75 and the GP equilibrium disappears. None of these equilibria seems stable in the
long run.
———–table 2 about here———–
The evolutionary problem is not due to an unfortunate parameter choice in the numerical
example. In the separating PBE, the vengeful type always achieves positive ﬁtness; otherwise
she would not try to play T. The unvengeful type always has negative ﬁtness in this equilibrium
because, with observational error rate a < 1/2, the payoﬀ -1 is more frequent than +1. (See
Table 2 for the general ﬁtness expressions.) Hence evolutionary forces will always increase x in
the separating PBE. In the GP equilibrium, the vengeful type always has lower ﬁtness because of
the extra cost (1 − e)vHe of reacting to Other’s trembles, so evolutionary forces will decrease x.
Unvengeful types in the GM equilibrium always have ﬁtness zero, and vengeful types always have
nonnegative ﬁtness. Once again, x will tend to increase until the equilibrium disappears. It seems
that evolution undermines perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
5.1 Equal Fitness Principle
The problem is not due just to the peculiarities of our noisy trust game. Games of incomplete
information generally have multiple types, and numerous mechanisms tend to increase the preva-
lence of high payoﬀ types relative to low payoﬀ types. For example, in an industry where ﬁrms
with high quality products compete with those with low quality, one expects the market share of
the less proﬁtable type of ﬁrms to decrease over time because such ﬁrms expand less rapidly or
exit, or switch types. As another example, a type of worker with lower full compensation (earnings,
beneﬁts and perks net of eﬀort cost and opportunity cost) should become less prevalent due to
earlier retirements, lower accession rates, etc.
The point is that payoﬀs should be equal across surviving types in long run equilibrium. In this
context, PBE (or any standard reﬁnement) is a short run equilibrium concept, while in the long run
the types and their relative prevalence should adjust so that only those types with highest payoﬀ
remain. This is precisely the “survival of the ﬁttest” principle of evolutionary theory. It is also
the textbook distinction between short run and long run competitive equilibrium. The Appendix
contains a formal deﬁnition; here we write out a verbal deﬁnition for long run equilibrium in
11extensive form games of incomplete information.
Deﬁnition. An evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE) is a PBE distribution over
type-contingent strategy proﬁles such that in each population all types in the support of the dis-
tribution achieve equal and maximal expected ﬁtness.
We now develop the EPBE concept speciﬁcally for our noisy trust game with endogenous values
for the vengeful type vH, its prevalence x and the perceptual error rate a. In EPBE, vH maximizes
ﬁtness over an appropriate space of types, which we shall take to be the closed interval [0,vmax].
The idea is that within broad limits, social (and perhaps genetic) forces shape Self’s emotional
response to violation of trust. We assume vmax > 0 is large enough not to be a binding constraint;
see Friedman and Singh (2004a) for a supporting discussion. In general one considers a distribution
or measure over the space of types, but (for reasons discussed above in connection with Figure 2)
the relevant distributions in the noisy trust game have support on at most two points, v = 0 and
v = vH < vmax.
A ﬁtness maximizing value vH > 0 will be characterized by a marginal balance between two
opposing eﬀects. When vengefulness increases,
Perception Eﬀect: Other is more likely to perceive v > c (or s = 1), and hence is more likely to
choose C, enhancing Self’s ﬁtness. However,
Cost Eﬀect: when Other chooses D (either intentionally or via a tremble), Self will incur greater
cost to punish him, reducing Self’s ﬁtness.
The cost eﬀect can be derived from model elements used in the PBE analysis, but the perception
eﬀect cannot. Extremely vengeful types should be easier than slightly vengeful types to distinguish
from v = 0 types, so the misperception probability a must be endogenized. For convenience
we simply postulate a = A(v),13 where A is a smooth, positive and decreasing function, with
A(0) = 1/2 and A(v) → 0 as v → ∞. Thus the types cannot be distinguished when vengefulness is
negligible, and can be distinguished perfectly in the limit as the vengefulness becomes extreme.
Crisp results require a parametric form for the perception technology A. Our choice is a simple
Gaussian function with precision parameter k > 0,
A(v) = 0.5exp(−kv2),so A0 = −2kvA. (1)
Besides the perception technology A (or precision parameter k > 0), we retain only two exoge-
nous parameters: the marginal punishment cost parameter c > 0 and the tremble rate e ∈ [0,1/2).
13In principle, one could derive A from the underlying distribution of perception errors y. In practice, estimating
the error distribution is unlikely to be as useful as estimating A directly. Note that the argument in Appendix 7.4
does not rely on a ﬁxed, exogenous a.
12We continue to assume error symmetry for simplicity.
Characterizing EBPE for the noisy trust game comes down to the following conditions. Given
the exogenous parameters, ﬁnd endogenous values for a,vH and x such that
1. There is a PBE strategy proﬁle for the exogenous parameters c and e and the endogenous
values a,vH, and x.
2. The misperception rate is a = A(vH).
3. The preference parameter vH maximizes Self’s expected ﬁtness given Other’s PBE strategy.
Formally,
vH = arg max
v∈[c,vmax]
{EqWS(v|A(v),e)}, (2)
where EqWS is the maximal expected ﬁtness Self can attain in the constrained strategy set
[e,1 − e], given Other’s q-mixed strategy. The cost eﬀect is captured in the argument v and
the perception eﬀect is captured in the conditioning variable A(v).
4. If 0 < x < 1 then the equal ﬁtness principle implies that the unvengeful type Self achieves the
same maximal expected ﬁtness as the vengeful type, given Other’s PBE strategy. Formally,
EqWS(0|A(0),e) = EqWS(vH|A(vH),e). (3)
That is, the strategy mix q employed by Other must equalize payoﬀs between unvengeful and
vengeful Selfs.
5. If 0 < q < 1 then the equal ﬁtness principle requires that both surviving types of Other
achieve equal ﬁtness, i.e.,
ExWO(CC|a,e) = ExWO(DC|a,e). (4)
One must also check that the extinct types of Other (DD and CD, and also DC when q = 0
and CC when q = 1) achieve no higher ﬁtness.
5.2 Results
What sort of PBE might survive the EPBE reﬁnement? The discussion at the beginning of this
section showed that the equal ﬁtness principle fails for the SEP and GP families of PBE; speciﬁcally
condition 4 fails except at GP with x = 1, where condition 3 fails. The discussion also showed that
the GM family is an unlikely habitat for EPBEs; the Appendix rules it out.
Clearly the BP family contains a trivial EPBE. The family exists when vengeful types are so
rare that Other always plays D, and so both types of Self play N. In this case the less vengeful
13are always ﬁtter because trembles hurt them less. Hence the vengeful types become extinct, i.e.,
x → 0, so the only possible BP candidate for EPBE is at the extreme, x = 0. It indeed is an
EPBE: condition 1 holds because we are already working with a PBE, condition 3 holds because
v = 0 uniquely maximizes Self’s ﬁtness, and conditions 2, 4 and 5 are moot. In this EPBE (except
for double trembles) there are no mutual gains.
When might there be an eﬃcient EPBE, one that supports mutual gains in the noisy trust
game? The BM and BH families are unlikely habitats, again ruled out in the Appendix. The
remaining family, Good Hybrid (GH), seems more promising because it allows both vengeful and
unvengeful Selfs to achieve positive ﬁtness, sometimes higher for the vengeful and sometimes higher
for unvengeful. The GH strategy proﬁles are (TT, qDC + (1-q)CC).
Our main result is that such an eﬃcient EPBE does exist and is unique over a wide range of
the exogenous parameters. The upper bound on the tremble rate is an increasing function ˆ e(k) of
the precision parameter k, derived in the Appendix. This bound is approximately 0.23 (i.e., players
might tremble a bit more than once in ﬁve tries) when k = 0.5 as in the unit Normal distribution,
and it is about 0.13 for k = 0.1.
Proposition 2. Given marginal punishment cost c ∈ (0,1), behavioral error rate e ∈ (0, ˆ e(k)),
and perception technology (1) with precision parameter k ∈ (0,0.6), there is a unique eﬃcient (Good
Hybrid) EPBE whose characteristics (vH,a,q,x) depend smoothly on the exogenous parameters.
There is only one other EPBE in the noisy trust game: the trivial (Bad Pooling) EPBE with
proportion x = 0 of vengeful types. It exists for all perception technologies, all marginal punishment
costs c > 0, and all behavioral error rates e ∈ (0,1/2).
The parameter k is bounded above by ¯ k ≈ 0.612; at higher values, the second order condition
for vH fails. A ﬁnite value of vmax creates a lower bound on k; for example v < vmax = 10 implies
k > 0.028. The proposition restricts parameter c to its natural interval (0,1). Higher values of c
(for which Self’s ﬁtness reduction is larger than Other’s) can tighten the upper bound on k due to
the constraint vH > c. For example, when c = 2 the upper bound is near k = 0.3.
The proof appears in the Appendix. It is constructive, and proceeds by writing explicit versions
of the last three equations, solving them in terms of the exogenous parameters, and checking the
relevant side conditions. It turns out that the equilibrium values vH = v∗(k) and a = a∗(k) depend
on k but are independent of e and c, while q = Q(e,k) is independent of c, and x = X(c,k) is
independent of e.
Some of the comparative statics for the eﬃcient EPBE are intuitive and others take a little
explanation. The Appendix shows that v∗(k) decreases in k. That is, as suggested by the perception
14eﬀect, the equilibrium level of vengeance declines as perceptions become more precise. Perhaps
surprisingly, a∗ is increasing in k, that is, the equilibrium observational error rate goes up as the
precision increases. It turns out that the indirect eﬀect via v∗(k) dominates the direct eﬀect of k.
How about the probability with which Other attends to perceptions? Q(e,k) increases in the
tremble rate e as a consequence of the Self’s indiﬀerence condition (3), and decreases in the precision
of perceptions, k. Finally, the equilibrium fraction X(c,k) of vengeful Selfs increases in the cost
of punishment c as a consequence of the Other’s indiﬀerence condition (4). However, the precision
parameter k can have either a positive or negative eﬀect on X depending on the level of c.
6 Discussion
We may summarize the argument as follows. Economists need to come to grips with human motives
such as vengeance. Since vengeance generally reduces own material payoﬀ or ﬁtness, its persistence
is an evolutionary puzzle. We therefore construct a model in which a taste for vengeance survives in
a long run evolutionary equilibrium. The model uses emotional state dependent utility components
(ESDUCs) to represent such motives. The presence of ESDUCs is the proximate answer to the
question of why individuals may want to harm (or help) others. However, the deeper questions
of why speciﬁc ESDUCs exist and how they survive requires an analysis of their indirect ﬁtness
consequences. Studying vengeance is just one (interesting and complicated) application of the
indirect evolutionary approach.
Our answer to the evolutionary puzzle proceeds in three stages. First, we construct a simple but
representative situation in which ESDUCs matter, viz., a noisy version of the Trust game played
in large unstructured groups. Second, we compute all perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). We note
that diﬀerent types of individuals (vengeful or not) have diﬀerent ﬁtness in most PBE, leaving
room for evolutionary pressures to operate. The third stage, therefore, is to introduce a new long
run equilibrium concept called evolutionary PBE, which allows adjustment in the proportion of
vengeful types, as well as the intensity of their vengefulness. We characterize the unique eﬃcient
EPBE for a wide domain of parameter values.
The conclusions are fairly robust within the context of the noisy Trust game. The argument can
accommodate more general speciﬁcations of the payoﬀs, the perception technology, the punishment
technology and preferences, and asymmetric perception errors. The Appendix shows that the
expressions become much messier but the qualitative results are unchanged.
At least three open questions remain for the noisy Trust game. First, are the EPBE dynami-
15cally stable? The answer may depend the speciﬁc form of adjustment dynamics.14 Friedman and
Singh (2004a) suggests that short run dynamics enforcing PBE are entirely cultural (e.g., imitation
or belief learning), and that the longer run dynamics enforcing EPBE also are mostly cultural
(e.g. family moral codes) with some genetic components (e.g., capacity for anger). A relatively
uncontroversial form of group selection (Wright’s shifting balance) may promote convergence to the
eﬃcient EPBE. Adjustment dynamics surely are an important area for future work.
A second question concerns the trivial EPBE: how can one get a critical mass to escape it? Put
more simply, in the context of the basic Trust game in Figure 1, how can one get v > c starting
from v = 0? Friedman and Singh (2004b) suggests a possible answer to this threshold problem.
Subthreshold v < c is not adaptive in a large population, but in small groups it works together
with the discount factor δ to increase ﬁtness. Thus positive values of v could get started in smaller
groups and eventually become advantageous in larger groups.
Third, which remaining parameters can be endogenized? Keeping punishment technology c
constant (or doing comparative statics exercises for c) seems to make sense. The tremble rate
parameter e trades oﬀ trivially against the endogenous probability q that Other attends to the
perception, as can be seen from equations (7) and (10) in the Appendix. However, there is every
reason to take seriously the evolution of perception technology. Obviously Others who evolve a
better perception technology (e.g., a lower value of k) would receive a ﬁtness boost. On the other
hand, so would a mutant Self with true vengeance parameter v = 0 who could somehow mimic
the vengeful type, in eﬀect increasing k. Friedman and Singh (2004b) refer to this possibility as
the Viceroy problem, a reference to toxic Monarch butterﬂies that correspond to vengeful types
and their mimics known as Viceroys. That paper sketches an elaborate solution to the problem
that involves interactions within and across small groups, but the issue remains open for large
unstructured populations.
How might the ideas extend to more general classes of games? After all, people play many
diﬀerent social games, not just the noisy Trust game.15 For example, consider the famous Ultima-
tum game. The ﬁrst mover proposes a division of a ﬁxed pie. A second mover with v = 0 will
accept any proposal that gives him a positive payoﬀ, but in most experiments the second mover
often rejects small oﬀers, giving both players zero payoﬀ. Cox et al (2007) estimate parameters
14The dynamic analysis is complex since we have a continuum of potential types. Our current conjecture is that for
all sensible dynamics the trivial (and ineﬃcient) EPBE will have an open basin of attraction, and that the eﬃcient
EPBE will be stable in the same sense for some dynamics and for other sensible dynamics will be neutrally stable
(e.g., will have a one dimensional stable manifold and a two dimensional center manifold).
15Our methods apply directly to any stable mix of games, and comparative statics apply to small one-time shifts
in the mix. Large or continuing shifts in the mix would require a dynamic analysis.
16that translate to v > 0, but they do not consider equilibrium. It is reasonable to conjecture that
a noisy version of the Ultimatum game supports two EPBE: a trivial EPBE with only v = 0 and
greedy proposals, and an equitable EPBE with a mix of vengeful and unvengeful second movers
and with more generous proposals.
We do not claim existence and uniqueness of nontrivial EPBE in great generality. In our Trust
game (and also, it would seem, in a noisy Ultimatum game) the payoﬀ ordering of vengeful and
unvengeful types diﬀers in diﬀerent PBE, and this was the key to obtaining the nontrivial EPBE.
We suspect that only trivial EPBE can exist when the same type in a given population has the
highest payoﬀ in every PBE, or when there are not enough margins for evolutionary adjustment.
As for non-uniqueness, Abreu and Sethi (2003) obtain a continuum of EPBE in a bargaining model
with wide classes of behavioral types. On the other hand, Friedman and Singh (2004a) study a
simultaneous move social dilemma and obtain an eﬃcient equilibrium, implicitly an EPBE with
only one particular vengeful type. The questions of EPBE existence, uniqueness and eﬃciency
remain open for general classes of games.
To conclude, the present paper combines two ideas, each of which we believe has widespread
applicability independent of the other. Emotional state dependent utility components (ESDUCs)
oﬀer a tractable and ﬂexible way to model other-regarding preferences, and can address several
important issues in behavioral economics. In particular, the vengeful components emphasized in
the present paper may help give new insights into ”irrational” conﬂicts ranging from employment
relations to international struggles. Friendly components likewise may give insight into behavior
within the family and ﬁrm, and into the dynamics of charitable giving and social capital.
The second idea is evolutionary Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). We wrote a general
verbal deﬁnition and worked it out explicitly for a particular (and not especially simple) game of
incomplete information. The Appendix concludes with a more general deﬁnition and remarks. We
believe that EPBE is an appropriate characterization of long run behavior when there are multiple
potential ”types” and some opportunity for entry, exit and/or switching among types. EPBE
endogenizes the set of types and their proportions, key variables that otherwise must be speciﬁed
arbitrarily. Many games of incomplete information could be reconsidered in this light.
177 Appendix. Mathematical Details.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1

















Also, let r∗ = [1 + vH − e(2 + vH)]/[(1 − a)(1 − 2e)(2 + vH)] = q∗(1+vH
2+vH − e)/(1
2 − e) ∈ (q∗,1) and

















To check for all PBE we map out the best response correspondences (building in Bayesian
updating) and look for mutually consistent proﬁles. We proceed stepwise.
Step 1. Conﬁrm that CD is dominated. Recall from the payoﬀ structure that Other is indiﬀerent
between C and D iﬀ E(v|s) = c, and strictly prefers C (D) if E(v|s) > (<)c. It follows that DD
dominates CD if c > E(v|s = 0), and that CC dominates CD if c < E(v|s = 1). At least one of
these two cases always holds since E(v|s = 1) > E(v|s = 0), establishing the claim. ♦
Step 2. The only undominated Self strategies in Figure 6A are those on the NW frontier. Any
other strategy Y can be written as a convex combination of CD and a NW frontier strategy, since
the set is the convex hull of its four corners, and the other three corners are contained in the NW
frontier. But step 1 shows that CD and hence Y is dominated. ♦
————–Figure 6 about here————
Step 3. TN is not a best response to any undominated strategy of Self. Direct computation
shows that the best responses are as in Figure 6C: TT along the portion of the N frontier (convex
combos of CC and DC) east of q∗, NT around the NW corner, and NN for the portion of the W
frontier south of r∗.
To spell it out, we show explicitly that NT is always the best response to DC, as is TT to CC,
given the hypotheses 0 < a,e < 1/2 and α = a+e−2ae ≤ 1/(2+vH). Suppose that Other will play
DC. Then Self with v = vH will face D with probability α = (1−e)a+e(1−a) = a+e−2ae when
playing T. A simple calculation shows that Self’s expected payoﬀ is nonnegative (and therefore
she will indeed try to play T) as long as α ≤ 1/(2 + v), which holds by hypothesis. Self with
v = 0 will face D with probability 1 − α when playing T; and she will avoid doing so as long as
α ≤ 1/(2 + v) = 1/2, a redundant condition. Hence NT is indeed the best reply to DC. If instead
Other plays CC, the condition ensuring that Self indeed wants to play T is the same as before,
taking a = 0, so it holds a fortiori. Hence TT is a best response to CC.
18The q∗-mix of DC and CC that makes Self indiﬀerent between NT and TT is precisely the mix
that gives unvengeful Self zero expected payoﬀ when actually choosing T, because the actual N
payoﬀ is also (always) 0. This condition is 0 = EqWS(T|v = 0) ≡ 1(1 − γ) − 1γ, or γ = 1/2,
where γ is the probability that Other actually chooses D when unvengeful Self chooses T. There
are three ways this can happen: Other ignores s but trembles, with probability γ1 = (1−q)e; Other
incorrectly perceives s = 1 and trembles, with probability γ2 = qae; and Other correctly perceives
s = 0 and doesn’t tremble, with probability γ3 = q(1 − a)(1 − e). So the condition is 1/2 = γ =
γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = e + q(1 − 2e)(1 − a). The solution is indeed q∗ = 1/(2 − 2a), and is clearly unique.
It follows that NT (resp. TT) is Self’s best response to qDC + (1-q)CC for q ∈ [0,1] larger (resp.
smaller) than q∗.
By a very similar argument, one veriﬁes that r∗ = q∗(1+vH
2+vH − e)/(1
2 − e) makes vengeful Self
indiﬀerent between N and T in response to r-mixes of DD and DC. (The condition is that vengeful
Self obtains payoﬀ zero from T, or 0 = −(1+v)[(1−e)−r(1−a)(1−2e)]+[1−(1−e)+r(1−a)(1−2e)],
with root r∗.) Again, it follows that NN (resp. NT) is Self’s best response to rDD + (1-r)DC for
r ∈ [0,1] larger (resp. smaller) than r∗. ♦
Thus any mutual best response involves only the NW frontier strategies, TT-NT-NN for Self
and CC-DC-DD for Other. The proof will be complete after we check all combinations for mutual
consistency.
To streamline notation, let L1 = L(c/vH)−L(a); L2 = L(c/vH)−L(a)+L(e); L3 = L(c/vH)+
L(a); and L4 = L(c/vH)+L(a)+L(e). We have Li < Li+1 because L(a) and L(e) are positive for
a,e < 1/2.
Step 4. Suppose ﬁrst that Other perceives s = 0 when Self plays NT. Recall that in this case the
perception is erroneous with probability x(1 − e)a and is correct with probability (1 − x)e(1 − a).
Hence by Bayes Theorem c = E(v|s = 0) = vH Pr[v = vH|s = 0] + 0 = vH[x(1 − e)a/(x(1 − e)a+
(1 − x)e(1 − a))]. Cross-multiply, divide both sides by ca(1 − e)(1 − x) and collect terms to obtain
1−x




c/vH ). Recall L(y) = ln(
1−y
y ) for y ∈ (0,1), so ln(
y
1−y) = −L(y). Hence Other
is indiﬀerent after seeing s = 0 when L(x) = −L(a)+L(e)+L(c/vH), and prefers D when the prior
odds L(x) that v = vH are longer. When Self plays NT, Other will correctly perceive s = 1 with
probability x(1−e)(1−a)and incorrectly perceive it (i.e., when v = 0) with probability (1−x)ea.
Algebra similar to the s = 0 case shows that L(x) ≤ L(c/vH) + L(e) + L(a) now motivates Other
to play C. Note that L(a) is positive since a < 1/2. Hence DC is Other’s best response to NT over
the relevant x-range. If Self plays TT and
s = 0, the expression (1−x)e(1−a) for NT is replaced by (1−x)(1−e)(1−a) in the Bayesian
algebra, and the 1 − e factors cancel. The usual cross multiplication and simpliﬁcation now shows
19that Other wants to play C even when s = 0 iﬀ L(x) ≤ L(c/vH)−L(a). That is, CC here is a best
response to TT.
These computations are summarized in the ﬁrst two lines of Figure 6D. The top line indicates
that the unique best response to TT (or to NN!) is CC for L(x) < L1, is DC for L1 < L(x) < L3,
and is DD for L(x) > L3; at L1 the best responses are CC and DC (and convex combinations),
and at L3 the best responses are DD and DC (and convex combinations). Likewise, the second line
indicates that the unique best responses to NT are CC for L(x) < L2, DC for L2 < L(x) < L4,
and DD for L(x) > L4; at L2 the best responses are all convex combinations of CC and DC, and
at L4 they are all convex combinations of DD and DC.♦
Step 5. We now examine every Self strategy that could be part of a PBE, ﬁnd all best responses
by Other, and check for mutual consistency. Begin with TT. For L(x) < L1, the unique best
response is CC, and TT is its best response, so we see that the GP family (TT, CC) is a PBE, and
that there is no other candidate in this case. For L(x) = L1, step 4 told us that the best responses
to TT are convex combinations of DC and CC. Step 3 told us that TT is a best response to the
convex combination qDC+ (1-q)CC iﬀ q ∈ [0,q∗], and is never a best response to DD or DC (or
convex combinations). Hence the only PBE where Self plays TT and L(x) = L1 consist of the
q ∈ [0,q∗] mixes, i.e., the GH family. When L(x) > L1, the best response to TT is DD or DC, to
which TT is never a best response. Hence there are no other PBE proﬁles where Self plays TT.♦
Step 6. Now consider strict mixes of TT and NT. By Figure 6D, the unique best response is
CC for L(x) < L1, but NT can’t be a best response to CC so no such PBE is possible here. For
L(x) > L2 the best responses are DC and DD, neither of which admits TT as a best response, so
again no such PBE is possible. But for any x such that L1 ≤ L(x) ≤ L2 we can construct a unique
PBE, which takes the Good Mix form (t∗(x)TT+(1-t∗(x))NT, q∗DC+(1-q∗)CC). The construction
proceeds as follows.
Recall from step 3 that only q∗ = 1/(2−2a) mixes of DC and CC allow strict mixes of TT and
NT as best responses. Hence it suﬃces to ﬁnd t∗(x) ∈ (0,1) such that convex combinations of DC
and CC are best responses to the the t∗ mix of TT and NT. That is, t∗(x) makes Other indiﬀerent
between N and T when s = 0. The condition is c = E(v|s = 0) = vHβ, where β is the posterior
probability that Self is vengeful. Thus β = x(1−e)a/η, where η is the unconditional probability of
Other seeing s = 0, which now can happen in three diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst way (also represented
in the numerator) is that a vengeful Self doesn’t tremble but is misperceived: η1 = x(1 − e)a. The
second way is that an unvengeful Self tries to play T, doesn’t tremble, and is correctly perceived:
η2 = t(1 − x)(1 − e)(1 − a). The last way is that an unvengeful Self tries to play N, trembles,
and is correctly perceived: η3 = (1 − t)(1 − x)e(1 − a). Hence η = η1 + η2 + η3 and the condition
20(after cross-multiplying) is η1vH/c = η1 + η2 + η3. Collecting the η1 terms and dividing through
by a(1 − x)(1 − e) we obtain equation (5). Observe that the RHS of (5) is strictly increasing in t
since 0 < e < 1/2. When t = 0 in (5) we obtain L(x) = L2, and when t = 1 we obtain L(x) = L1.
Hence for intermediate values of x, which satisfy the given inequalities L1 ≤ L(x) ≤ L2 we obtain
from (5) a unique t∗ ∈ [0,1] that makes Other indiﬀerent between C and D when s = 0.♦
Step 7. Now consider pure NT. The argument has the same structure as step 5. We conﬁrm
that for x such that L2 ≤ L(x) < L4, the SEP family (NT, DC) is the only PBE in which Self plays
NT. For L(x) = L4, the best responses to NT are convex combinations of DC and DD, and NT is a
best response to rDD + (1-r)DC iﬀ r ∈ [r∗,1]. NT is never a best response to convex combinations
of CC and DC. Hence we pick up the BH family. When Other best responds to NT with DD (as
will happen if L(x) > L4), then Self’s best response is not NT but rather NN. Likewise, when
Other best responds to NT with CC (as will happen if L(x) < L2), then Self’s best response is not
NT but rather TT. In neither case can we have a PBE of the desired form.♦
Step 8. Now consider strict mixes of NN and NT. The argument has the same structure as
step 6. Self will play such a mix in mutual best response only if L3 ≤ L(x) ≤ L4 and Other plays
the r∗ mix of DC and DD. The mix of NN and NT that allows Other to mix DC and DD must
satisfy c = E(v|s = 1) = vH(κ1 + κ2)/(κ1 + κ2 + κ3), where κ1 = xu(1 − a)(1 − e) for correctly
perceived vengeful Self not trembling, κ2 = x(1 − u)(1 − a)e for correctly perceived vengeful Self
trembling, κ3 = (1−x)ae) for incorrectly perceived unvengeful Self trembling. The expression can
be rewritten to obtain (6). Hence we obtain the BM family and no other PBEs.♦
Step 9. Finally consider pure NN. For L(x) > L3, DD is the unique best response, and NN is of
course the best response to DD, so we see that the BP family (NN, DD) is a PBE, and that there
is no other candidate in this case. For L(x) = L3, the only candidates are the BP and the extreme
BM with u = 0; both are already picked up. When L(x) < L3, the best response to NN is CC or
DC, for which NN is never a best response. Hence there are no other PBE proﬁles where Self plays
NN. ♦
Step 10. We picked up the GP and GH families at step 5, the GM family at step 6, the SEP
and BH families at step 7, the BM family at step 8, and the BP family at step 9. Since we now
have looked at all possible equilibrium proﬁles, the proof is complete.♦
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2 and comparative statics
For convenience, the derivations of comparative statics are included in this proof. The Proposition




2−2a+2R(k). These are functions of the exogenous parameter k because in equilibrium v and
21a are speciﬁc functions (derived below) of k only.
The ﬁrst and most laborious step in the proof is to derive vH for a given k. Recall that
the Good Hybrid strategy proﬁle is (TT, qDC+(1-q)CC), so the probabilities in Table 1 give
the ﬁtness function EqWS(v) = (1 − e)[q(1 − α − (1 + v)α) + (1 − q)((1 − e) − (1 + v)e)] =
(1 − e)[1 − (2 + v)e − qa(2 + v)(1 − 2e)]. The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) 0 = dEqWS/dv for the





]q−1 = −(2 + v)A0 − a. (7)









and the SOC is
kv3 + 2kv2 −
3
2
v − 1 ≥ 0. (9)
Equation (3) says that vengeful and unvengeful type Selfs coexist in the EPBE because they
have equal ﬁtness. Recall that EqWS(v) = (1 − e)[1 − (2 + v)e − qa(2 + v)(1 − 2e)]. Recall also
that we are looking for an EPBE in which even the unvengeful try to play T, so EqWS(0) =
(1 − e)[q(α − (1 − α)) + (1 − q)((1 − e) − e)] = (1 − e)[1 − 2e − q(2 − 2a − 4e + 4ae)]. Thus (3)





]q−1 = (2 − a(4 + v))/v. (10)
Note that (8) and (10) have the same left hand side. Equating the right hand sides, we get
2kv(2 + v)a − a = (2 − 4a)/v − a or
kv3 + 2kv2 + 2 = 2exp(kv2) = 1/a. (11)
This equation holds trivially for v = 0 and a = 1/2, but we now show that it also implicitly
deﬁnes a candidate equilibrium level of vengefulness v∗(k) > 0.
Lemma 1. Equation (11) has a unique positive solution v∗(k) for any positive k. The solution
v∗(k) decreases in k over the range where the second order condition (9) is valid.
22Proof of Lemma. At v = 0 both sides of (11) are equal to 2, and have equal slopes of 0. The LHS
has slope 4kv(1+ 3
4v) and the RHS has slope 4kv exp(kv2) = 4kv(1+kv2+...). For small positive v
(up to approximately v = 3
4k) the LHS has steeper slope but the reverse is true for larger v (indeed,
the slope ratio tends towards ∞). Hence RHS = LHS at some v ≈ 3
4k (with this approximation
being better for larger k and smaller v), so (11) indeed has a unique positive solution v∗(k) for any
positive k.
Implicitly diﬀerentiate (11) to get
v∗0(k) = −[v3 + 2v2 − 2v2 exp(kv2)]/[3kv2 + 4kv − 4kv exp(kv2)]. (12)
Use (11) to substitute for the exponential term and rearrange to obtain
−kv∗0(k)/v = [kv2 + 2kv − 1]/[2kv2 + 4kv − 3]. (13)
The RHS of (13) is [g + 1
2]/[2g] for g(k) = kv2 + 2kv − 3
2. Rewrite the second order condition (9)
as g ≥ 1/v, and since v > 0, we have g > 0. Hence the RHS of (13) is positive. Since v and k are
also positive, we conclude from (13) that v∗0(k) < 0 when the SOC holds. ♦
We now show that the SOC (9) holds over the indicated range of k and is independent of the
other exogenous parameters.
Lemma 2. Let v = v∗(k) and g(k) = kv2 +2kv − 3
2, and deﬁne S(k) ≡ vg. Then the equation
S(k) = 1 has a unique solution k = ¯ k ≈ 0.612, and the second order condition (9) holds as an
equality iﬀ k = ¯ k, and holds as a strict inequality iﬀ k ∈ (0,¯ k).
Proof of Lemma. Write (9) as S(k) ≥ 1. We ﬁrst show that S strictly decreases in an open set
U containing S−1[1,∞). By direct computation we get S0(k) = v3 + 2v2 + (v0)(3kv2 + 4kv − 3
2).
Use (13) and simplify to write the RHS in the form [vM]/[2kg], where v and k are positive and g
is positive in U. The messy factor reduces to M = −[(kv2 + 1
2)g + 3
4], which is strictly negative in
U. Hence S indeed strictly decreases in U.
Use v = O(1/k) from the proof of Lemma 1 to conclude that S → ∞ as k → 0 and S → 0 as
k → ∞. Hence by the intermediate value theorem there is some k ≥ ε > 0 such that S(k) = 1;
let ¯ k be the smallest such k. We have S0(¯ k) < 0 and by the deﬁnition of U and continuity we
have S0(k) < 0 ∀k > ¯ k s.t. S(k) ≥ 1 − . It follows that S is strictly bounded above by 1 −  on
(k + δ,∞). Therefore ¯ k is the unique solution to S(k) = 1 and the SOC fails for k > ¯ k. Numerical
methods give ¯ k ≈ 0.612. ♦
Equations (8), (10) and (11) together with Lemmas 1 and 2 show that vH = v∗(k) and v = 0
indeed both maximize Self’s ﬁtness, and that vH = v∗(k) has the indicated comparative statics.
We still must ﬁnd corresponding values of a,q and x; check their comparative statics; and verify
the EPBE conditions.
23The misperception rate is simply a = a∗(k) ≡ A(v∗(k)). To check its comparative statics, insert
v∗(k) into A(v) = 0.5exp(−kv2) and diﬀerentiate to get da∗
dk = −(2kvv0 + v2)A. Use (13) to get
2kvv0 + v2 = v2/(3 − 4kv − 2kv2) = −v2/(2g) < 0. Hence da∗
dk > 0, so indeed a increases in the
precision parameter k.
Other’s mixing probability q appears on the left hand side of both (8) or (10). Use the right hand
side of (8) with v = v∗(k) to get the desired function of k only, R(k) ≡ (kv(2 + v) − 1
2)exp(−kv2).
Note that R(k) has the same sign as 2kv2 + 4kv − 1 = 2g + 2, which is positive over (0,¯ k]. It
therefore makes sense to rewrite (8) as




Inspection of (14) shows that Q is increasing in e. To show that Q(e,k) is decreasing in k, use
(14) to write Q = e
(1−2e)
exp(kv2)




8g(1+g) [1−vg −2g]. All factors are positive except [1−vg −2g], which is negative
because vg > 1 by the SOC and 2g > 0, so indeed ∂Q/∂k < 0.
The fraction x of vengeful Selfs comes from (4), which is the same PBE condition that deﬁned
L(x) = L1 ≡ L(c/vH) − L(a). Hence





Conditions already imposed, viz., vH > c > 0 and 0 < a < 1/2 (or simply the domain of L), ensure
that 0 < x < 1. Since a and vH are independent of c, inspection of (15) reveals that x is increasing
in c. Simulations show that x can be increasing or decreasing in k, depending on the value of c.
The construction of (vH,a,q,x) guarantees the last four of the ﬁve EPBE conditions listed at
the end of section 5.1. The only remaining condition, the ﬁrst, is that (TT, qDC+(1-q)DD) is a




2 − 2a + 2R(k)
≡ ˆ e(k). (16)
Hence the hypothesis e ∈ (0, ˆ e(k)) is suﬃcient, and we have veriﬁed the existence of a unique EPBE
in the GH family.
The second paragraph of section 5.2 already veriﬁed the ineﬃcient EPBE, vH = 0,a = 1/2,x = 0
with strategy proﬁle (NN,DD). The veriﬁcation works for any values a ∈ [0,1/2), c > 0 and k > 0
of the exogenous parameters, and shows that there are no other candidate EPBE in the BP family.
The discussion in section 5 also eliminated the GP and SEP families. We have just shown that
there is only one EPBE in the GH family.
24Is there an EPBE in the BH family (NT, rDD+(1-r)DC) for some r ∈ [r∗,1]? To investigate,
ﬁrst note that the vengeful Self’s payoﬀ here is ErWS(v) = (1 − e)[r(e − (1 + v)(1 − e)) + (1 −
r)((1 − α) − (1 + v)α)]=(1 − e)[1 − (1 − e)(2 + v) + (1 − r)a(1 − 2e)(2 + v)]. Hence
(1 − e)−1dErWS/dv = −(1 − e) + (1 − r)(1 − 2e)ξ(v), (17)
where ξ(v) ≡ a + (2 + v)A0. Note that ξ(v) < 1/2 because a < 1/2 and A0 < 0. Hence (17) is
negative for all r ∈ [r∗,1], indeed, for all r ∈ [0,1]. Since ErWS(v) is decreasing in v, EPBE
condition 3 cannot be satisﬁed, eliminating the BH family.
How about the BM family? It also requires that NT be a best response to rDD+(1-r)DC), for
r = r∗. Hence the same argument also eliminates the possibility of an EPBE in this family.
The GM family is the last possibility, and its close relation to the GH family allows us to rule
it out. The EPBE equal payoﬀ condition (10) and the deﬁnition of R(k) imply e
1−2e = qR(k).
Imposing the GM condition q = q∗ = 1/(2 − 2a) and rearranging yields the following necessary
condition for an EPBE in the GM family:
e =
R(k)
2 − 2a + 2R(k)
≡ ˆ e(k). (18)
Hence the equal payoﬀ condition fails within the relevant parameter domain e < ˆ e(k). ♦
Remark. The last part of the proof uses the fact that an EPBE in the GM family would have to
satisfy a zero payoﬀ condition (for the unvengeful type, hence for the vengeful type Self playing T)
as well as the conditions imposed in the eﬃcient (GH) EPBE. The proof shows these conditions are
not compatible in the relevant open set of exogenous parameters, but leaves open the possibility
that they are compatible on the boundary e = ˆ e.
7.3 Notes on more general models.
The basic payoﬀs can be normalized for each population so that without loss of generality the
payoﬀs following action N are (0,0), and those following T then C are (1,1). A general Trust game
has three restrictions on the payoﬀs (ς,τ) following T then D, namely ς < 0, τ > 1 and ς + τ < 2.
If the choice (−1,2) used in the text is replaced by more general (ς,τ) satisfying these restrictions,
then in subsequent analysis one must replace the condition v > c by v > c(τ − 1) for Other’s
choices, and replace the condition Pr[C] > 0.5 by Pr[C] > ς/(ς −1) for Self’s choices. It is tedious
but straightforward to check that the PBE families still exist and that the key orderings of Self’s
payoﬀs across PBE still hold. Likewise, this holds for diﬀering Type I and type II misperception
probabilities.
Generalizing the perception technology A requires additional considerations. The maintained
assumption is that A is a smooth, positive and decreasing function, with A(v) → 0 as v → ∞ and
25A(0) = 1/2. For such a function, existence of v∗ > 0 is established as follows. First, impose the
second order condition noted in the proof of Proposition 2 above, (i) (2+v)A00+2A0 ≥ 0. Next, note
that equations (7) and (10) still have the same left hand side, so we can equate the right hand sides
and rearrange to get the condition (]) 4A − 2 = (2v + v2)A0. Since A(0) = 0.5, condition (]) holds
for v = 0. Since A(v) → 0 as v → ∞, the left hand side asymptotes to -2. If (ii) (2v + v2)A0 → 0
as v → ∞, then the right hand side has a larger asymptote. Hence, if for some smaller value the
right hand side is smaller, i.e., if (iii) there exists v > 0 such that (2v + v2)A0 < 4A − 2, then by
continuity condition (]) must hold for some v∗ > 0. Hence v∗ > 0 exists if (i), (ii) and (iii) hold,16
and it is easy to see that all three are satisﬁed by a wide variety of functions besides the Gaussian.
For example with simple exponential A(v) = 0.5exp(−kv), condition (]) has two positive roots for
k > 0 suﬃciently small, and (i-iii) hold for the larger root when k ≤ 0.2. The conditions do have
some bite, however. The perception technology A(v) = 1/(2 + kv) is admissible for all positive k
and (]) has a positive solution iﬀ k < 1/2. However, (i) fails for k < 1 so no eﬃcient EPBE exists
for this technology. Our tentative interpretation is that perception eﬀect is inadequate when the
tail is too fat, i.e., when the asymptotic error rate is O(1/v).
7.4 Preliminary computation of Self’s ﬁtness.
Figure 3 indicates that Self’s ﬁtness has a local maximum at v = 0, a global minimum near c − σ
and a global maximum near c + σ. An argument supporting this conclusion is as follows. Let
e ≥ 0 be the behavioral noise amplitude as in the text. Assume that it is small, in particular
that e < 1/(2 + vmax), where vmax is a ﬁnite upper bound on the vengeance parameter. To deﬁne
the observational noise amplitude σ ≥ 0, let z be a continuous random variable located at zero
(i.e., mean=mode=median=0) with an otherwise arbitrary density function h(z) and cdf H(z). For
example, z could have a uniform or the unit Normal distribution. Other perceives not Self’s true
vengefulness v, but rather a noisy version u = v + σz.
Key to the analysis is the probability P(v) that Other will try to play D against Self with true
parameter v, or equivalently, that c will exceed Other’s posterior expectation of v. Computation is
straightforward when Other has a uniform prior distribution for v. In this case, Other’s posterior
expectation of v is simply his noisy observation u and so P(v) = Pr[u < c|v] ≡ Pr[σz < c − v] =
H(c−v
σ ). Then P0(v) = −σ−1h(c−v
σ ) < 0; its minimum is attained at −σ−1h(0) when v = c. Hence
the inverse Mills ratio P(v)/|P0(v)| attains a positive minimum of approximately σ/(2h(0)) near
v = c. When Other has prior on v with positive density in the relevant neighborhood but otherwise
16One still has to check that other variables determined in equilibrium are in their feasible ranges, but the implied
restrictions were redundant in the examples we checked.
26arbitrary, the computation is much messier. It still can be shown that P(v)/|P0(v)| attains a
positive minimum of approximately κσ near v = c. (Now κ depends on the prior density as well as
on h.) The approximations hold exactly in the limit as σ → 0.
The preceding computation helps characterize the ﬁtness function wS(v|σ,e). The probability
that Other will actually play D (not just try) is α(v) = e + (1 − 2e)P(v), and so Self will achieve
ﬁtness β(v) = 1 − (2 + v)α(v) if she actually plays T and ﬁtness 0 otherwise. Self will try to play
N when β(v) < 0 and will try to play T when β(v) ≥ 0. Thus
wS(v|σ,e) = eβ(v) if β(v) < 0,
= (1 − e)β(v) otherwise.
When σ is small, P(0) ≈ 1 and β(0) ≈ −(1−2e) < 0, while for v moderately above c, P(v) ≈ 0
and β(v) ≈ 1−(2+v)e > 0. Suppose that β has two regular critical points, one near c−σ and the
other near c + σ. Since β0(0) = −(1 − e) < 0 we see that β and wS slope downward from 0 to the
ﬁrst critical point, upward between the critical points, and downward beyond the second critical
point. It follows that β is zero only at one point between the two critical points, and hence wS
indeed has the shape indicated in Figure 2.
Thus it remains only to verify the critical points. They are given by the ﬁrst order condition
(FOC) 0 = β0 = 2α + (2 + v)α0. After straightforward algebraic manipulation the FOC can be
rewritten as P(v)/|P0(v)| = v/2 + (1 − 3e)/(1 − 2e). The Right Hand Side (RHS) of this last
expression has slope +1/2 and v = 0 intercept a bit below 1. As noted above, the LHS (the
inverse Mills ratio) has a unique minimum near c and (since P0 → 0 as v moves away from c in
either direction) and increases without bound on either side. The minimum value is of order σ so
for σ suﬃciently small there are exactly two regular solutions to the FOC and the veriﬁcation is
complete.
Figure 3 sketches wS using the indicated values of e and σ, a uniform prior and the unit
triangular density function for z.
7.5 A more general deﬁnition of EPBE
Equations (2-4) deﬁne EPBE for a particular PBE of a particular game. We now propose a more
general deﬁnition of EPBE that may provide additional insight. To better connect with standard
literature we use notation in this subsection that is not entirely consistent with the rest of the
present paper.
27Take as given a ﬁnite set of player populations i = 1,...,I. In the model, I = 2 and i = 1 is
called Self and and i = 2 is called Other. For each population i there is given a set Θi of possible
types. In the model, Θ1 = [0,vmax] and Θ2 = {0,1}. Let P be the set of feasible joint population
distributions (or priors) p = (p1,...,pI) over Θ = Θ1 × ... × ΘI. For given p ∈ P, the support of p
is the smallest closed set in Θ containing population proﬁles with total mass 1. The set Si(p) ⊂ Θi
of surviving types in population i is the projection of the support of p onto Θi. In the model,
S1(p) = {0,vH} and p1(v) = 1 − x for v = 0 and = x for v = vH but otherwise = 0, while
S2(p) = Θ2 and p2(0|v = vH) = A(vH) = p2(1|v = 0). Thus for given perception technology A the
set P of feasible distributions is a 2-dimensional set parametrized by x ∈ [0,1] and vH ∈ [0,vmax],
and each feasible distribution p has discrete support consisting of the four corners of a rectangle
contained in [0,vmax] × [0,1].
Deﬁne actions and (partial) histories and, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p 331), use these
to deﬁne (type-contingent mixed behavior) strategies σi and beliefs µi. Deﬁne the payoﬀ function
ui(θi|p,σ) as the expected payoﬀ for type θi when the type distribution is p and the strategy proﬁle
is σ = (σ1,...,σI). Note that the payoﬀ function is deﬁned for all θi ∈ Θi, not just for θi ∈ Si(p),
because σi speciﬁes an action mixture at every information set for every type θi ∈ Θi. The model
used notation such as EqWS(vH|A(vH),e) for the function u1, with q and e referring to parameters
of the strategy σ.
For distribution p ∈ P let PBE(p) denote the set of PBE of the game just described, i.e., the
set of pairs (σ,µ) that satisfy Deﬁnition 8.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991 pp. 331-333, 349). As
noted earlier, the deﬁnition says that beliefs µ are derived via Bayes theorem from the prior p and
the observed partial histories, and the strategy proﬁle σ employs only expected utility maximizing
actions at each information set.
Deﬁnition. An evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a triple (σ,µ,p) such that
1. p ∈ P and (σ,µ) ∈ PBE(p), and
2. for each population i = 1,...,I and each θi ∈ Si(p), the payoﬀ ui(θi|p,σ) ≥ ui(˜ θi|p,σ) for all
˜ θi ∈ Θi.
Item (2) is the equal, maximal payoﬀ property: equilibrium payoﬀs of each surviving type
achieve equal and maximal payoﬀ in each population. It subsumes condition 3 on v in the EPBE
deﬁnition in section 5.
We close with a series of remarks on the nature of EPBE.
• The original evolutionary equilibrium concept (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), ESS, is
a static concept that applies to symmetric bimatrix games. Similarly, EPBE is a static
28equilibrium concept for extensive form games of incomplete information that leaves implicit
the evolutionary dynamics.
• EPBE appears to be new. In the context of a bargaining game with incomplete information,
Abreu and Sethi (2003) independently
introduce essentially the same concept, and use it to examine the long run persistence of
certain ”irrational” types of bargainers. To the best of our knowledge, other papers that
consider evolution in games of incomplete information allow arbitrary distributions of types
that generally have diﬀerent ﬁtnesses. For example, N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1997) and
Jacobsen et al (2001) ﬁx the proportions of two seller types (high quality and low quality)
and model the evolution of buyer beliefs regarding the costly signals sent by sellers. Such
analysis apparently applies to short or medium run equilibrium before the more proﬁtable
types can increase their market share.
• We regard EPBE as an appropriate concept for long run equilibrium whenever (a) mate-
rial payoﬀs such as income or evolutionary ﬁtness can be compared across types, and (b)
adjustment mechanisms can aﬀect existing types and their prevalence. Earlier deﬁnitions
of evolutionary equilibrium might be interpreted as long run equilibria when the types are
determined by last minute circumstance, and evolutionary selection applies to complete type-
contingent strategies rather than to the types themselves.
• Appealing features of EPBE are that it endogenizes crucial variables and selects among multi-
ple equilibria. One often has a multiplicity of PBE that depend rather sensitively on arbitrary
exogenous speciﬁcations of the types and their distribution. EPBE can greatly reduce the
equilibrium set while endogenizing the set of types and their distribution. In our noisy trust
model, EPBE collapses seven continuous families of PBE to just two points.
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e.g., shirking,  
predation and parasitism 
III. Vengeance 
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Figure 2: Fitness Payoffs  
 
 
A. Basic Trust Game 
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*Utility payoff to Self is  - 1 – ch + ln h 
 
 
C. Reduced Trust with a vengeance 
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Notes: Arrows denote direction of evolutionary dynamics; the open and closed circles denote 
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Note: O denotes Other; S
ij denotes Self with vengeance level i and perception j, as determined by Nature’s move. 
The four branch labels are Nature’s move probabilities. 
 Table 1: PBE Probabilities 
 
  Fitness Payoff  Equilibrium Probability 
  Choice      Self, Other  (NT, DC) 
Separating  
(TT, DC) 




v = vH  (N,  .)       
(T, C)       
(T, D)    
       0,     0 
       1,     1  
 -(1+v), 2-v/c 
e 
(1 – e)(1 – α) 




(1 – e)e 
1 - e 
e
2 
e(1 – e) 
 
v = 0  (N,  .)   
(T, C)    
(T, D)       
       0,     0 
       1,     1 
      -1,     2 
1 - e 
eα 




(1 – e)e 
1 - e 
e
2 
e(1 – e) 
 
Note: Other observes s = 1 with probability a in (0, ½) when v = 0, and observes s = 0 with probability a when v = 
vH. Other chooses his less preferred action with probability α = a(1 – e) + e(1 – a) = e + a – 2ae. Figure 5: PBE Example 
 

























x = 0.002 
L = 6.24 
x = 0.036 
L = 3.30 
x = 0.136 
L = 1.85 
x =  0.75 
L = -1.10 
Bad Mix 
Good  
Hybrid  Bad 
Hybrid 
 
Note: The vertical axis conflates q and r and so has no meaningful scale, but the vertical segments reflect the fact 
that the GH equilibrium coincides with GP at q=0 and with GM at q=q*, while the BH equilibrium coincides with 
BP at r=1 and with BM at r=r*. 
 
  
Table 2: PBE Calculations 
 
  Fitness function  Value in example 
  Non-vengeful type 
v = 0 
Vengeful type 
 v = vH 
Non-vengeful type  
v = 0 
Vengeful type 
v = vH 
Separating   e(2α – 1)  (1 – e)(1 – (2 + vH ) α)  - 0.036  0.418 
Good Pooling   (1 – e)(1 – 2e) (1  –  e)(1 – (2 + vH ) e)  0.855  0.760 
Bad Pooling  – e(1 – 2e)   –  e(1 + vH  – (2 + vH ) e) -  0.045  -0.140 
Good Mix  (1 – e)[1– 2e – 2q(1– e–α)]   (1 – e)[1– (2 + vH )e – qα (2 + 
vH ) (1– 2e)] 
0 0.608 
Bad Mix   e[– (1 – 2e)+2(1– r)(1– α– e)] (1  –  e)[1– (2 + vH ) α  – r((2 + 
vH ) (1– α– 2e) + 2e)] 
-0.646 -2.242 
 
Notes:  Example parameter values are a = 0.1, e = 0.05, c = 0.5, vH = 2. The hybrid equilibria will involve the fitness 
functions indicated for the corresponding mixed equilibria, with q and r varying within their ranges rather than fixed 
at particular numerical values. 
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D. Other’s Best Response depends on L(x) 
 
 
BR to TT or NN is: 
 
 
to NT   is: 
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Pr[C | s = 0] 
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e  1 − e 
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1 
A. Other’s undominated strategies 
are on the NW frontier 
− e 
Pr[T | v = 0] 






t →   
BR to Other’s 
undominated set 
B. Self’s BR to Other’s undominated 
strategies are also on the NW frontier 
TT NT NN